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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 900466 
vs. : 
Oral Argument 
JAY P. MUNSEY. M.D. , : Priority No. 16 
RICHARD HORNE, D.C., and 
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC : 
CLINIC, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
The order appealed from was entered June 4, 1990. (R. 138-
40.) The order dismissed the case as against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., 
only; Richard Home, D.C., and Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
remained parties. A determination of finality was entered pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) on September 17, 1990. (R. 172-74.) 
Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on October 2, 1990. (R. 175-
76.) Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Is the sixty-day period for filing a request for 
prelitigation panel review in a medical malpractice action a 
jurisdictional requirement, the violation of which will justify 
dismissal of an action? This is a question of statutory construc-
tion reviewed by this Court for correctness, with no particular 
deference to the determination of the trial court. Avila v. Winn. 
794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). 
B. Is the prelitigation panel review process an 
unconstitutional violation of equal protection principles? This 
presents a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Was defendant's statute of limitations defense barred 
where there was an administrative determination that all statutory 
requirements regarding prelitigation review had been satisfied, 
and defendant did not appeal from or otherwise challenge that 
administrative determination? This is a question of law decided 
by summary judgment, and should be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
D. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion for 
new trial on the ground that no trial had been conducted? Although 
the granting of a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, the issue of whether a new trial was available 
is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
Gaw v. State, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A copy of the version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987, 
current version in Supp. 1990) in effect at the times relevant to 
this action is set forth in the appendix. The statute was amended 
in 1989, but the changes are relatively minor and would not have 
affected this action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action seeking 
damages for medical malpractice. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff 
filed her Complaint on June 15, 1988. (R. 1-6.) Defendant Jay P. 
Munsey, M.D. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 10, 
1989. (R. 49-51.) The motion was granted by ruling entered May 
16, 1990. (R. 132-35.) A formal order granting the motion was 
entered June 4, 1990. (R. 138-40.) 
On July 19, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a 
determination of finality pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). (R. 
163-64.) The motion was granted by a Determination of Finality 
entered September 17, 1990. (R. 172-74.) Plaintiff filed her 
notice of appeal on October 2, 1990. (R. 175-76.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiff consulted with defendant 
Jay P. Munsey, M.D., on March 18, 1985, complaining of a numbness 
in the right side of her face and hand. She again consulted with 
Dr. Munsey on October 15, 1985. (R. 2, 16-17.) Dr. Munsey failed 
to diagnose that plaintiff had a brain tumor at the time she 
consulted with him, and his failure to properly diagnose the 
condition was a departure from the applicable standard of care. 
(R. 86.) 
On January 5, 1986, plaintiff suffered a convulsive seizure, 
during which it appeared that her heart stopped and that she 
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stopped breathing. She was resuscitated, and ultimately underwent 
surgery to remove the tumor. (R. 3.) 
On or about December 21, 1987, plaintiff serveid a notice of 
intent to commence action on the defendants. (R. 53, 66-68; copy 
in Appendix F.) Plaintiff served a request for prelitigation 
review on March 2, 1988, 68 days after service of the notice of 
intent to commence action. (R. 96.) 
Plaintiff served an amended notice of intent to commence 
action on or about March 4, 1988. (R. 53, 72-75; copy in Appendix 
G.) 
In connection with the prelitigation panel review proceedings, 
Dr. Munsey filed a Motion for Order Denying Request for Pre-
litigation Panel Review with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce. (R. 105-
07.) The motion requested the Division to deny plaintiffs request 
for prelitigation review dated March 2, 1988, on the ground that 
it was not filed within 60 days of the service of the notice of 
intent to commence action. (Id.) The Division nonetheless 
conducted the prelitigation panel review, and on May 6, 1988, the 
director of the Division certified that "all requirements set forth 
in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have been satisfied 
regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter." (R. 
109.) 
Plaintiff filed her complaint June 15, 1988. (R. 1-6.) Dr. 
Munsey subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that (1) 
the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) 
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plaintiff had not proffered expert testimony showing that her 
injuries were caused by Dr. Munsey's negligence. (R. 49-51.) 
Plaintiff subsequently filed a responsive memorandum (R. 95-114), 
and also filed an affidavit setting forth expert testimony of 
causation. (R. 85-94.) 
The motion for summary judgment was considered by the court 
without oral argument and a ruling granting the motion on the 
statute of limitations grounds was entered May 16, 1990. (R. 132-
35.) A formal Order was entered June 4, 1990. (R. 138-40.) 
On June 14, 1990, plaintiff served a Motion for New Trial and 
for Reconsideration. (R. 147-48.) The motion was filed with the 
court on June 15, 1990, and the court signed a ruling denying the 
motion on the same date. (R. 160-61.) Plaintiff thereafter 
perfected this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987, current version in Supp. 
1990), which provides for prelitigation panel review of certain 
medical malpractice actions, was enacted by the legislature in 
1985, at the same time as several other modifications to the tort 
system in Utah. No statement of the statute's purpose or justi-
fication for its classification was set forth in the enacting bill, 
and no evidence on the subject was presented before the trial court 
in this case. The experience with the prelitigation review process 
subsequent to the enactment shows that the statute in fact serves 
no purpose. No rational justification can be articulated for 
applying the terms of the statute to negligence actions against 
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doctors, chiropractors, hospitals, dental hygienist, and others, 
while the statute does not apply to negligence actions against 
dentists, lawyers, engineers, or to other professionals. The 
statute violates the uniform operations of laws provisions of the 
Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I § 24. 
The trial court improperly failed to consider: plaintiffs 
constitutional challenges to the prelitigation panel review 
process. The constitutional arguments were raised in a timely 
motion for new trial. The trial court held that a new trial motion 
was not available where no trial had been held. This conclusion 
was erroneous, and this Court should consider the constitutional 
arguments to have been properly raised before the trial court. 
Even if the statute is held to be constitutional, it can be 
constitutional only if it is not a jurisdictional bar to commencing 
an action. The statute7s evident purpose is to help eliminate non-
meritorious claims prior to commencing of an action. Nothing in 
the statute evinces an intent to create a second statute of 
limitations; yet that is how the statute was applied in the instant 
matter. The 60-day requirement for filing a request for pre-
litigation panel review must be interpreted to be a non-jurisdic-
tional requirement, one which may be extended by the prelitigation* 
review panel or by the court. The panel in the instant case 
evidently agreed to accept the request for prelitigation panel 
review, even though it was a few days late. The review was held, 
and the director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing issued an affidavit that all requirements relating to 
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prelitigation panel review had been satisfied. Defendant was 
required to seek judicial review of that determination within 30 
days if defendant disagreed with the Directors conclusion. 
Defendant did not do so, and is now bound by the Directors 
determination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SIXTY-DAY FILING REQUIREMENT OP 
§ 78-14-12 IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL BAR. 
Point II of this brief argues that the prelitigation panel 
review process creates an unconstitutional denial of equal 
protection and results in a non-uniform application of the laws. 
Although plaintiff submits that the prelitigation panel review 
process is unconstitutional in any event, the unconstitutionality 
is exacerbated if the 60-day filing requirement is viewed as a 
jurisdictional bar to proceeding with an action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1987, current version at Supp. 
1990) states that a party commencing a medical malpractice claim 
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review within 60 days 
after serving a notice of intent to commence action. The statute 
does not set forth the effect of a failure to so file within 60 
days. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987), provides that where a notice 
of claim is filed less than 90 days prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations (which arguably occurred in this case if the 
statute commenced to run on January 5, 1986), the limitations 
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period is extended to 120 days from the date of service of the 
notice. This 120-day extension is meaningless if the 60-day 
limitation of § 78-14-12 is interpreted as a jurisdictional 
limitations period, since a failure to request a panel hearing 
within 60 days would bar the action even though there remained 60 
days of the 120-day extension. 
If the 60-day requirement is interpreted as a jurisdiction 
bar, it becomes a statute of limitations in and or itself. There 
is no indication of any legislative intent that the 60-day 
requirement was meant to be a limitations trap for unwary 
plaintiffs. The prelitigation panel review process was established 
not to place additional obstacles in the path of injured plain-
tiffs, but rather to "provide other procedural changes to expedite 
early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-2 (1987). 
The trial court in the instant case interpreted the 60-day 
requirement of § 78-14-12 as creating a second statute of 
limitation. This interpretation contrary to the evidence of 
legislative intent to lengthen the statute of limitations as 
evidenced in subparagraph 3 of the statute, which states that "the 
filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days 
following the issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3) (1987, current version at Supp. 1990). 
There is no evidence of legislative intent that the statute be 
interpreted as was done by the trial court. See Tewari v. 
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Tsoutsouras, 75 N.W.2d 1, 549 N.E.2d 1143, 1146, 550 N.W.S.2d 572 
(1989) (failure to timely file notice in medical malpractice action 
would not warrant dismissal where there was no evidence the 
legislature "contemplated the imposition of such a draconian 
sanction for noncompliance")1. 
Other deadlines exists in litigation, such as those associated 
with discovery, but a failure to meet them does not result in 
dismissal or rob the court of jurisdiction. Rule 6 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides further guidance. Under Rule 6, 
extension is allowed for all except a very few specified procedural 
deadlines. Those exceptions involve appeal or other attempts to 
get relief from a prior judicial determination. The 60-day period 
at issue in this case clearly does not relate to a prior judicial 
determination; rather, it relates to a preliminary matter leading 
up to a determination. As such, it should not be applied as an 
inflexible bar to litigation, but rather as a deadline which may 
be extended. 
If the 60-day requirement of § 78-14-12 is interpreted as an 
extendable deadline, plaintiff's claim would not be barred. Her 
request for prelitigation panel review was made approximately 68 
days after her notice of claim, and was well within the 12 0-day 
extension of the limitations period provided by § 78-14-8. 
A concurring opinion in Tewari further noted that the failure 
to timely file the notice was due to "law office failure," not the 
fault of the plaintiff, and stated that "the power to dismiss 
actions for xlaw office failure7—even when so fundamental a 
document as a pleading is involved—is not to be lightly implied." 
549 N.E.2d at 1149 (Kaye, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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Defendant filed a motion to have the request for prelitigation 
panel hearing stricken as untimely, but the panel nonetheless 
proceeded with the prelitigation panel review. The panel thereby 
treated the 60-day requirement as non-jurisdictional, and 
implicitly accepted the request for prelitigation panel review as 
timely.2 
If the court nonetheless determines that the 60-day 
requirement is jurisdictional, then the limitation must be stricken 
as unconstitutional. In Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231 (Fla. 
1980), a mandatory mediation was terminated prior to its 
conclusion, which left the plaintiff without a remedy since the 
limitations period had run. The court found the limitation to be 
inflexible, and then stated: "Equally clear, however, is that in 
the cases before us the absolute jurisdictional periods in [the 
statute] served to deprive petitioners of due process. It is basic 
to our scheme of justice that a person aggrieved by fundamental 
unfairness in the judicial process have the right and opportunity 
to remedy that unfairness." 381 So.2d at 23 6. The court later 
stated: 
The result we reach here is indeed 
ironic. The medical mediatio act is un-
constitutional because applies ion of its 
rigid jurisdictional periods has proven arbi-
trary and capricious in operatior yet the act 
cannot be remedied by en~ rging the 
2
 Point III of this brief points out that the director of the 
Department of Occupational and Professional Licensing, which 
conducts the pre-litigation panel review, determined that all 
requirements of § 78-14-12 were satisfied in this case. Defendant 
did not appeal from or seek judicial review of that determination, 
and is now bound by it. 
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jurisdictional periods or permitting con-
tinuances or extensions of time, for to do so 
would constitute a denial of access to the 
courts. We are left, then, with a statute 
which is intractably, and incurably, 
defective. 
381 So. 2d at 238. 
The same reasoning applies here. Should the court interpret 
the 60-day period as an inflexible statute of limitation, then it 
must be simultaneously invalidated as unconstitutional. 
POINT II 
THE PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW PROCESS IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OP EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES. 
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P. 2d 348 (Utah 
1989), this Court stated that the uniform operations of laws 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I § 24, 
requires a two-part test to insure the uniform operation of laws: 
"First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. 
Second the statutory classifications and the difference given the 
classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute." 775 P.2d at 
352 (citation omitted). This Court stated that statutes limiting 
recovery rights in the medical malpractice area are subject to 
heightened scrutiny, whether referred to as intermediate or 
realistic rational basis. 775 P.2d at 356. This Court also stated 
that the open courts provision is an extension of the due process 
clause; thus the due process balancing test also applies. 775 P.2d 
at 356. The due process test balances the reasonableness of the 
legislation against the rights protected by the Constitution. 
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This Court's heightened scrutiny approach is consistent with 
that of other state supreme courts which have applied heightened 
scrutiny to medical malpractice legislation. See e.g., Carson v. 
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980) (applying 
an intermediate standard of scrutiny to invalidate medical mal-
practice legislation); Farley v. Enqelken, 241 Kan. 662, 740 P.2d 
1058 (1987) (holding that medical malpractice plaintiffs are a 
"semi-suspect" class, and invalidating medical malpractice legisla-
tion) ; Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978); and Jones 
v. State Board of Medicine. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), 
cert, denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (applying an intermediate 
standard of scrutiny to invalidate a statutory cap on damages, and 
remanding with instructions to apply the same constitutional 
principles to legislation establishing medical malpractice 
screening panels). 
Applying the reasonableness test of heightened scrutiny as set 
forth in Condemarin above, the statute at issue, § 78-14-12, must 
fail. Under the second part of the test quoted in Condemarin, the 
classification and treatment must be based on differences which 
reasonably tend to further the objectives of the statute. A 
recently published report evidences that the requirement of 
prelitigation panel review has failed to further the stated purpose 
in § 78-14-2 of expediting early evaluation and settlement of 
claims. In Carnahan & Pullins, A Survey of Practitioners' 
Perceptions of Utah's Medical Malpractice Pre-Litiqation Program, 
3 BYU J. Pub. L. 105 (1989), a survey of one hundred seventy-two 
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attorneys who had gone before the prelitigation panels in Utah led 
to the conclusion that the prelitigation panel review process has 
not furthered the stated purposes: 
The statistics indicate that the [pre-
litigation panel review process] is 
ineffective: an overwhelming majority of the 
practitioners surveyed stated that their 
opinion of the case did not change as a result 
of the hearing. Further, only a slight 
majority of the total group saw the process as 
beneficial in defining the issues or in 
screening cases from District Court. 
In addition, unlike most forms of 
alternative dispute resolution that statis-
tically favor the petitioner/plaintiff, the 
data from this study shows an opposite result. 
Here, over 80% of the cases pre-screened 
received a non-meritorious finding. Such a 
reversal might be result of the dominance of 
the medical professional on the panel or the 
non-binding nature of the proceedings. 
The panel program is costly in several 
important respects. . . . It is also expen-
sive for the litigants in terms of additional 
attorney fees and other costs associated with 
the delay. The proceedings cost the pro-
fessionals on the panel in that they are only 
nominally compensated for their time. 
During the first year of the program 
(1985), filings for hearings exceeded Division 
expectations by two hundred percent. Such a 
statistic poses a question of whether this 
panel approach may actually increase the 
number of cases that are pursed. The cost 
efficiency of such a program is also drawn in 
question by the possibility that additional 
expenses incurred in connection with mandatory 
non-binding arbitration may out weigh the 
savings realized by a reduced number of cases 
going to trial. "Moreover, once the costs of 
a panel hearing have been incurred, the 
incremental costs of proceeding to trial are 
reduced, which tends to encourage litigation." 
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BYU J. Pub. L., at 132-33 (quote from P. Danzon, Medical 
Malpractice; Theory, Evidence and Public Policy 200 (1985)). 
Because the prelitigation panel review process has failed in 
serving the purpose of expediting early evaluation and settlement 
of malpractice claims and has actually increased the financial and 
procedural burdens placed on malpractice plaintiffs, it currently 
serves no other purpose than to place unforeseen traps in the path 
of malpractice plaintiffs. 
Moreover, regarding the constitutionality of the statute as 
already interpreted by the court, it should be noted that even 
under a rational basis standard, § 78-14-12 should not be upheld. 
In Boucher v. Saveed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court applied the rational basis test and invalidated that 
state's medical malpractice screening panel statute as a violation 
of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 
The court noted that although a medial malpractice insurance crisis 
may have existed in Rhode Island at the time the statute was 
enacted, no such crisis existed the time of the challenge. 459 
A.2d at 93. The court stated: "Absent a crisis to justify the 
enactment of such legislation, we can ascertain no satisfactory 
reason for the separate and unequally treatment that it imposes on 
medical malpractice litigants. The statute constitutes special 
class legislation enacted solely for the benefit of specially 
c,fined defendant health care providers." 459 A.2d at 93. 
In a similar manner, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Hoem v. 
State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988), held unconstitutional the Wyoming 
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medical malpractice screening panel statute on the ground that the 
statute violated the statue constitution equal protection 
provision. The court applied the rational basis test and noted 
that there was no evidence in the record showing that a medial 
malpractice crisis existed in Wyoming or elsewhere. The court 
stated: "It cannot seriously be contended that the extension of 
special benefits to the medical profession and the imposition of 
an additional hurdle in the path of medical malpractice victims 
relate to the protection of the public health." 756 P.2d at 783. 
Similarly, here in Utah no showing has been made that a 
medical malpractice crisis now exists in Utah, whether or not a 
crisis actually existed at the time the statute was enacted. Under 
the heightened level of scrutiny applicable to claimed violations 
of the equal protection of the laws, the burden is on the party 
asserting constitutionality to demonstrate a legitimate legislative 
purpose served by the statute. State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd, 786 
P.2d 1343, 1350 (Utah 1990); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 368 
(Zimmerman, J. concurring); Farley v. Enqleken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 
P.2d 1058, 1061 (1987). In the absence of such a showing, the 
prelitigation panel review requirement only places a burden in the 
path of medical malpractice plaintiffs. Such an arbitrary classi-
fication cannot be upheld but must be struck down as unconstitu-
tional, especially in the face of the serious nature of most 
medical malpractice injuries. 
The arbitrary nature of the special benefits extended to the 
medical profession by the prelitigation panel review process is 
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highlighted by the fact that under the current version of the 
statute, actions against dentist are not governed by the statute, 
whereas actions against dental hygienists and other health care 
providers are. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(1)(a) (Supp. 1990). It 
appears obvious that there can be no realistically rational 
explanation for the statute which applies to physicians, hospitals, 
and dental hygienist, but does not apply to dentists, lawyers, 
engineers, or other professionals. The statute creates an un-
constitutional classification resulting in a nonuniform application 
of the laws. The statute is unconstitutional and should be so 
declared by this Court. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
DETERMINATION THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 78-14-12 
WERE SATISFIED. 
Following plaintiff's request for a prelitigation panel review 
in this case, defendant filed a motion with the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing requesting the Division to 
deny the request for prelitigation panel review. (R. 105-07.) 
Notwithstanding the motion, the panel conducted the prelitigation 
review. Following the review, the Director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing issued his Affidavit of 
Compliance, certifying that all requirements of § 78-14-12 had been 
satisfied in this matter. (R. 109, copy in Appendix H.) 
The decision of the Director that the requirements of § 78-
14-12 had been satisfied was an agency determination of the legal 
interests of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(1)(a) (Supp. 
16 
1990) . If defendant was dissatisfied with the determination of the 
Director, defendant was required to seek judicial review within 30 
days. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3) (1989). 
Defendant failed to timely seek judicial review of the 
Director's determination that the requirements of § 78-14-12 were 
satisfied and is now barred from now challenging that determina-
tion. 
Defendant may argue that § 78-14-14 precludes judicial review. 
That section, however, only precludes judicial review of the 
decision or recommendations of the panel. No statutory provision 
prohibits judicial review of the Director's determination that the 
statutory requirements were satisfied. The defendant waived any 
challenge he may have had to the timeliness of plaintiff's request 
for prelitigation panel review, and the district court erred in 
failing to give preclusive effect to the Director's determination 
on that issue. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
Following the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, plaintiff timely served a Motion for a New Trial 
and for Reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion on the 
same date it was filed, asserting that a motion for new trial does 
not lie where no trial has occurred. The trial court's assumption 
was incorrect. A motion for new trial is a proper way to seek 
reconsideration of a case decided on summary judgment. Moon Lake 
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Electric Association, Inc. v. Ultrasvstems Western Constructors. 
Inc. , 767 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Robinson & Wells. 
P.C. v. Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1983). 
Although the grant of a new trial or reconsideration is 
normally vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, the 
trial court must apply correct legal principles in exercising its 
jurisdiction. Where the trial court applied the incorrect legal 
standard, plaintiff is entitled to have this case reversed with 
instructions to the trial court to reconsider the arguments in 
plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial and for Reconsideration. Ferris 
v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); Gaw v. State. 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Ct. App. September 13, 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
The requirements for prelitigation panel review set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 1990) are unconstitutional. The 
trial court erred in dismissing the case because of plaintiff's 
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of that statute. 
The case should be reversed to allow it to proceed to trial on the 
merits. 
Even if the statute is held to be constitutional, this Court 
should hold that the time requirements are not jurisdictional. 
Plaintiff substantially complied with the provisions of the statute 
and a prelitigation panel review was actually conducted. Defendant 
was not prejudiced in any way by the approximately eight-day delay 
in requesting the review. Defendant waived any objection by 
failing to seek judicial review of the determination by the 
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing that all 
requirements regarding prelitigation panel review had been satis-
fied. 
The judgment of dismissal should be reversed, and this case 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 199: 
DON R. PETERSEN 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 3rd 
day of January, 1991. 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. 
Elizabeth King Brennan, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
19 
APPENDIX "A" 
Ruling on Defendant Munsey's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
^ MAY 1 6 1990 
CLERK OF THSCodST
 y 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., ] 
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC ] 
CLINIC, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S 
I MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 5686 
The defendant, Jay P. Munsey, has filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment contending that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the Statute of Limitations that is applicable to this action. 
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the granting of the 
Motion, and both parties have submitted their Memorandums of 
Legal Points and Authorities and supporting documents and 
affidavits. 
Oral arguments were requested and set for May 7, 1990, 
and neither party appeared at the time set so the Court finds 
that oral arguments have been waived, and rules on the Motion 
as here and after stated. 
The undisputed facts show that Dr. Munsey commenced 
treating the plaintiff for a nervous disorder in March of 1985, 
and did not diagnose a brain tumor during that treatment period. 
That the plaintiff suffered a seizure on January 5, 
1986, and underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor 
on January 9, 1986. 
On December 21, 1977, plaintiff's attorney served 
defendant Munsey with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, 
and stated that the negligence was discovered on January 5, 
1986. 
The plaintiff failed to request a pre-litigation 
review as specified in Section 78-14-12(c) within the 60 days 
as mandated in that Section. 
The plaintiff then served a new Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action on defendant on March 4, 1988, which stated 
that the negligence was discovered on January 20, 1988. 
The question of when the two year Statute of 
Limitations begins to run has recently been reviewed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Deschamps v. Pulley, 12 3 Ut.Adv.Rep. 
34. It is quite clear from a review of that case and the legal 
principles set forth that the plaintiff in this case knew, or 
should have known, on January 5, 198 6, and certainly no later 
than January 9, 1986, that she had suffered an injury and that 
this injury was caused by negligence. 
It would be obvious to any reasonable person at that 
time that the Doctor had failed to properly diagnose her 
nervous system disorder and that there was the possibilty, and 
even the probablity of negligence. 
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The service of the first intent to commence action was 
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the 
pre-litigation panel review within the time limitation as 
specified, that notice became null and void. 
The service of the second notice of intent to commence 
action was beyond the two year Statute of Limitations as 
required for the commencement of this type of action. 
THEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to defendant Jay P. Munsey, and authorizes an order 
dismissing this case as to him. 
The Attorney for this defendant is directed to prepare 
findings and a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this / 3 day of May, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
12 0 East 3 00 North 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Thomas J. Erbin 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys at Law 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
DATED this /£ZA- day of May, 1990. 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "B 
Order 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
m 
BY 
J UN i\ 1990 
CLERK OF THE COURT J 
Oepyiy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD ) 
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY ] 
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. 
1 O R D E R 
i Civil No. 5686 
Defendant James P. Munsey, M.D.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment having been fully briefed, and both parties having 
waived oral arguments originally scheduled for May 7, 1990, 
and plaintiff being represented by her attorney, Don R. 
Peterson of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and defendant having 
been represented by his attorneys Elliott J. Williams and 
Elizabeth King Brennan of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and 
the court having reviewed the Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and supporting documents and Affidavits and being 
fully advised, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted since there is no 
genuine issue of any material fact relative to plaintiff's 
failure to comply with the statute of limitations applicable 
to this action and defendant is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law as reflected by this Court's ruling on 
this matter dated May 15, 1990. 
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above 
entitled action be and the same hereby is dismissed with 
prejudice as to the defendant Jay P. Munsey, each party to 
bear its own costs. ^ 
DATED this / ' day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
— O _ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing O R D E R by depositing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
Delphi Building 
12 0 East 3 00 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Richard Home, D.C. 
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab UT 84532 
DATED this /^f- day of June, 1990. 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "C" 
Motion for New Trial and 
For Reconsideration 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
m
 JUN 1 5 1990. 
Cl^RKOFTHECOUg^^/ 
***** s:gram-mot.dlp 
Our File No. 17,857 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD 
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB 
FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 5686 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a), for a new trial 
or hearing in this matter. The grounds for this motion is that the Court's ruling is contrary 
to the evidence presented and based on an error in law. 
Plaintiff further moves this Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), to reconsider 
its ruling on defendant Munsey's Motion for Summary Judgment. The ground for this 
motion is that the Court's ruling is contrary to law and based on a statute which is 
unconstitutional, and the interests of justice dictate that plaintiff be permitted to present 
additional arguments and law relevant to the issues. 
These motions are supported by a memorandum of authorities which is filed 
herewith. 
DATED this / ^ day of June, 1990. 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this / ^ ^ day of June, 1990. 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, Utah 84632 
APPENDIX "D" 
Ruling on Motion for New Trial 
and For Reconsideration 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
RUB 
JUN t 8 1990 
CLErtKOFTHECOUB? 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR. GRAND CCttfl4>¥—~^~ 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD | 
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY 
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. ; 
RULING ON MOTION 
| FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION 
i Civil No. 5686 
The plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial 
under Civil Procedure Rule 59(a), and for the Court to 
reconsider its prior ruling granting summary judgment to 
defendant Munsey, and states that she is relying on Civil 
Rule 54(b). 
Neither one of these Rules have any application to 
plaintiff's Motion since there was no trial, and certainly a 
motion for new trial could not be granted. Rule 54(b) has no 
application since there is no rule providing for a motion to 
reconsider a matter that has already been fully determined. 
The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to reargue 
matters already determined by the Court, and further attempts 
to assert additional matters of constitutionality of statutes 
that should have been presented during the prior 
determination. 
For these reasons, the Court hereby denies the 
Motion for a New Trial and for any reconsideration. 
DATED this AS> day of June, 1990. 
BOYD-' BIJNNEJrfL, T>ist£ic£< Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
FOR RECONSIDERATION by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab UT 84532 
DATED this /SXX^ day of June, 1990, 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "E" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1987) 
78-14-12. Department of Business Regulation to provide 
panel — Procedures established by department 
— Procedures for requesting panel — Notice — 
Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of 
panel — Members to receive per diem and travel 
expenses — Department authorized to set license 
fees of health care providers to cover costs of 
administering panel. 
(1) The Department of Business Regulation shall provide a hearing panel 
in alleged medical malpractice cases against health care providers as defined 
in § 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The department shall establish proce-
dures for prelitigation consideration of personal injury and wrongful death 
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide 
health care. The proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are compul-
sory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. Proceedings conducted 
under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from 
civil process. 
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the Department of Business Regulation 
within 60 days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence 
action under § 78-14-8. The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent 
to commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers 
named in the notice and request. 
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section 
tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days following the issuance 
of an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion shall be sent to all 
parties by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(4) The department provides for and appoints an appropriate panel or 
panels to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or 
on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are 
composed of: 
(a) one member appointed from a list provided by the commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar, who is a resident lawyer currently licensed to prac-
tice law in this state who shall serve as chairman of the panel; 
(b) one member who is licensed under § 78-14-3, who is practicing in 
the same specialty as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list pro-
vided by the professional association representing the same area of prac-
tice as the health care provider; or in claims against only hospitals or 
their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving in 
hospital administration and appointed from a list submitted by the Utah 
Hospital Association; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or 
other health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, 
selected and appointed by a unanimous decision of the members compris-
ing the panel. 
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that 
he or she is without bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter 
under consideration. 
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem com-
pensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by 
rules of the Department of Business Regulation. 
(7) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health 
care providers, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Business Regulation is authorized to set license fees of health 
care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportion-
ate costs of administering prelitigation panels. None of the costs of adminis-
tering the prelitigation panel shall be borne by the claimant, except as pro-
vided under § 78-14-16. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 1; 1986, ch. 170, § 2; 1987, 
ch. 92, § 159. 
APPENDIX "F" 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION 
TO: Jay P. Munsey, M.D. 
82 North Main 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreck Drive 
Moab, Utah 84532 
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that 
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an 
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic 
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business 
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given 
notice of the following: 
1. Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of 
you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich. 
2. Persons Involved. The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich. 
The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which 
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the 
named individuals. 
3. Date. Time and Place of Occurrence. The negligence occurred from 
March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his 
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office 
at the address stated above. The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on 
January 5, 1986. 
4. Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face 
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16 Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told 
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot 
pack. On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether 
the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that that was not 
the case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office. 
She again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her 
to a neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her 
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not 
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he 
advised her to continue taking it. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the 
same symptoms described above. Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there 
might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her 
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve. 
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months. 
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the 
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor. 
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which 
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but she was resuscitated by her husband. 
It was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to 
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986. 
The failures of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain 
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they each owed to 
her. 
5. Nature of Injuries. The full extent of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not 
known at present. Her injuries include, however, the following: She is required to 
^ 
take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her 
subject to an increased risk that any children she had would have had birth defects. 
She also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear 
causes her on-going distress and suffering. She has not regained her strength or full 
use of her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the 
surgery. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this -<V day of December, 1987. 
^ ^ ^ £ 
DON R. PETERSEN, for. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements contained 
therein are true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief. 
DANA GRAMLICH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this C< I day of December, 1987. 
J22 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
•t 
oM. 
APPENDIX "G" 
Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
AMENDED NOTICE TO COMMENCE ACTION 
TO: Jay P. Munsey, M.D. 
82 North Main 
Moab, UT 84532 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, UT 84532 
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that 
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an 
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic 
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business 
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given 
notice of the following: 
1. Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each o£ 
you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich. 
2. Persons Involved. The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich. 
The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which 
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the 
named individuals. 
3. Date. Time and Place of Occurrence. The negligence occurred from. 
March, 1985v through January 5, 1986_ The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his-
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office 
at the address stated above. The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on 
January 20, 1988, after receiving a report from Dr. Warren F. Gorman. 
4. Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face 
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16, Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told 
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot 
pack. On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether 
the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that was not the 
case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office. She 
again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her to a 
neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her 
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not 
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he 
advised her to continue taking it. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the 
same symptoms described above. Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there 
might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her 
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve. 
Y 
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months. 
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the 
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor. 
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which 
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but was resuscitated by her husband. It 
was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to 
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986. 
The failure of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain 
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they owed to her. 
5. Nature of Injuries. The full extend of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not 
known at present. Her injuries, however, include the following: She is required to 
take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her 
subject to an increased risk that any child she had would have had birth defects. She 
also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear causes 
2 
her on-going distress and suffering. She has not regained her strength or full us£of 
her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the 
surgery. 
GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this J l L day of March, 1988. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that .the statements 
contained therein arc true and to the best of her knowledge, information and belief. 
DANA GRAMLICH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this y day of March, 1988 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
3 
S E N O E R J poroplett Items i. 2;3 $nd 4 
Put your address In the *'R€TUHty 1 U'{ space on the 
reverse tide Failure )o do this will prevent this card from 
being returned to you, The return receipt tfe will provide 
you the name o* the person delivered to end the date of 
delivery Fof eddltionel feet the following service* are 
eveilable Consult postmaster for feet end checfc boxles) 
for serviced) requested. 
1. D 6how to whom, daft and address of delivery. 
2. D Restricted Delivery, 
3. Article Addressed to: 
Jay P, Munpey, M,Df 
82 Nosth Matin 
Moab, UT 84532 
4. Type of Service; 
D Registered P Insured 
Certified • COD 
Express Mali 
Article Number 
P 123 519 581 
Always obtain fignatuia of addressee or aoent and 
PATE DEI IVtcRED. , -% 
^ ^ , . , 
7. Date of Delivery* 
8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y [frequented and fee paid) 
c 
• - f t 
to 
8 
^ SENDER; Complete items 1 . 2, 3 and 4. 
Put your address in the '•RETURN TO" space on the 
/averse side Feilure to do this will prevent this card from 
being returned to you. The return receipt fee will provide 
you the name of the person delivered to end the date of 
delivery. For additional fees the following services are 
available Consult postmester for fees end check box(es) 
for servicers) requested. 
1 . D Show to whom, dete and address of delivery. 
2. O Restricted Delivery. 
3. Article Addressed to: 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, UT 84532 
4. Type of Service: 
D Registered D Insured 
*~" Certified • COD 
Express Mail 
Article Number 
P 123 519 575 
Always obtain signature of addressee £L*QGrU * n d 
P A T E D E L I V E R E D . 
O 
O 
o 
5. Signature — Addressee 
Signature — fa/gent 6. (ygant 
x 
7. Data of Oalivary 
8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y if requested and fee paid) 
APPENDIX "H" 
Affidavit of Compliance 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Hr'^- .*». Wells Building 
13 v. tc* I 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
j £ 2s -^ £» * cf s»sy 
L1AY 1 01988 
HOWARD- LEWIS & PET3SE* 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. PR-88-03-014 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
COMPLIANCE 
DANA GRAMLICH 
-vs-
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. 
RICHARD HORNE, D.C. 
Petitioner, : 
and : 
Respondents, : 
I, David E. Robinson, Director, Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing, Department of Business Regulation, hereby certify that all 
requirements set forth in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have 
been satisfied regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter. 
Dated this 6th day of May, 1988. 
David E. Robins 
Director 
S T A T E S E A L 
